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Abstract. One natural constraint in the sponsored search advertising framework arises from the fact that there is
a limit on the number of available slots, especially for the popular keywords, and as a result, a significant pool of
advertisers are left out. We study the emergence of diversification in the adword market triggered by such capacity
constraints in the sense that new market mechanisms, as well as, new for-profit agents are likely to emerge to
combat or to make profit from the opportunities created by shortages in ad-space inventory. We propose a model
where the additional capacity is provided by for-profit agents (or, mediators), who compete for slots in the original
auction, draw traffic, and run their own sub-auctions. The quality of the additional capacity provided by a mediator
is measured by its fitness factor. We compute revenues and payoffs for all the different parties at a symmetric Nash
equilibrium (SNE) when the mediator-based model is operated by a mechanism currently being used by Google and
Yahoo!, and then compare these numbers with those obtained at a corresponding SNE for the same mechanism, but
without any mediators involved in the auctions. Such calculations allow us to determine the value of the additional
capacity. Our results show that the revenue of the auctioneer, as well as the social value (i.e. efficiency ), always
increase when mediators are involved; moreover even the payoffs of all the bidders will increase if the mediator has
a high enough fitness. Thus, our analysis indicates that there are significant opportunities for diversification in the
internet economy and we should expect it to continue to develop richer structure, with room for different types of
agents and mechanisms to coexist.
1 Introduction
Sponsored search advertising is a significant growth market and is witnessing rapid growth and evolution. The analysis
of the underlying models has so far primarily focused on the scenario, where advertisers/bidders interact directly with
the auctioneers, i.e., the Search Engines and publishers. However, the market is already witnessing the spontaneous
emergence of several categories of companies who are trying to mediate or facilitate the auction process. For example,
a number of different AdNetworks have started proliferating, and so have companies who specialize in reselling ad
inventories. Hence, there is a need for analyzing the impact of such incentive driven and for-profit agents, especially
as they become more sophisticated in playing the game. In the present work, our focus is on the emergence of market
mechanisms and for-profit agents motivated by capacity constraint inherent to the present models.
For instance, one natural constraint comes from the fact that there is a limit on the number of slots available
for putting ads, especially for the popular keywords, and a significant pool of advertisers are left out due to this
capacity constraint. We ask whether there are sustainable market constructs and mechanisms, where new players
interact with the existing auction mechanisms to increase the overall capacity. In particular, lead-generation companies
who bid for keywords, draw traffic from search pages and then redirect such traffic to service/product providers, have
spontaneously emerged. However, the incentive and equilibria properties of paid-search auctions in the presence of
such profit-driven players have not been explored. We investigate key questions, including what happens to the overall
revenue of the auctioneers when such mediators participate, what is the payoff of a mediator and how does it dependent
on her quality, how are the payoffs of the bidders affected, and is there an overall value that is generated by such
mechanisms.
Formally, in the current models, there are K slots to be allocated among N (≥ K) bidders (i.e. the advertisers).
A bidder i has a true valuation vi (known only to the bidder i) for the specific keyword and she bids bi. The expected
click through rate (CTR) of an ad put by bidder i when allocated slot j has the form γjei i.e. separable in to a position
effect and an advertiser effect. γj’s can be interpreted as the probability that an ad will be noticed when put in slot j
and it is assumed that γ1 > γ2 > · · · > γK > γK+1 = γK+2 = . . . γN = 0. ei can be interpreted as the probability
that an ad put by bidder i will be clicked on if noticed and is refered as the relevance of bidder i. The payoff/utility of
⋆ This work was done while the author was working for Ilial Inc.. The financial support from Ilial Inc. is highly acknowledged.
bidder i when given slot j at a price of p per click is given by eiγj(vi − p) and they are assumed to be rational agents
trying to maximize their payoffs. As of now, Google as well as Yahoo! uses schemes closely modeled as RBR(rank by
revenue) with GSP(generalized second pricing). The bidders are ranked according to eivi and the slots are allocated as
per this ranks. For simplicity of notation, assume that the ith bidder is the one allocated slot i according to this ranking
rule, then i is charged an amount equal to ei+1vi+1
ei
. Formal analysis of such sponsored search advertising model has
been done extensively in recent years, from algorithmic as well as from game theoretic perspective[2, 6, 3, 1, 7, 4, 5].
In the following section, we propose and study a model wherein the additional capacity is provided by a for-profit
agent who competes for a slot in the original auction, draws traffic and runs its own sub-auction for the added slots. We
discuss the cost or the value of capacity by analyzing the change in the revenues due to added capacity as compared to
the ones without added capacity.
2 The Model
In this section, we discuss our model motivated by the capacity constraint, which can be formally described as follows:
– Primary Auction (p-auction) : Mediators participate in the original auction run by the search engine (called
p-auction) and compete with advertisers for slots (called primary slots). For the ith agent (an advertiser or a medi-
ator), let vpi and bpi denote her true valuation and the bid for the p-auction respectively. Further, let us denote vpi epi
by spi where e
p
i is the relevance score of ith agent for p-auction. Let there are κ mediators and there indices are
M1,M2, . . . ,Mκ respectively.
– Secondary auctions (s-auctions):
• Secondary slots: Suppose that in the primary auction, the slots assigned to the mediators are l1, l2, . . . , lκ re-
spectively, then effectively, the additional slots are obtained by forking these primary slots in toL1, L2, . . . , Lκ
additional slots respectively, where Li ≤ K for all i = 1, 2, . . . , κ. By forking we mean the following: on
the associated landing page the mediator puts some information relevant to the specific keyword associated
with the p-auction along with the space for additional slots. Let us call these additional slots as secondary slots.
• Properties of secondary slots and fitness of the mediators: For the ith mediator, there will be a probability
associated with her ad to be clicked if noticed, which is actually her relevence score epMi and the position
based CTRs might actually improve say by a factor of αi. This means that the position based CTR for the jth
secondary slot of ith mediator in modeled as αiγj for 1 ≤ j ≤ Li and 0 otherwise. Therefore, we can define
a fitness fi for the ith mediator, which is equal to epMiαi. Thus corresponding to the lith primary slot (the one
being forked by the ith mediator), the effective position based CTR for the jth secondary slot obtained is γ˜i,j
where
γ˜i,j =
{
γlifiγj for j = 1, 2, . . . , Li,
0 otherwise. (1)
Note that fiγ1 < 1, however fi could be greater than 1.
• s-auctions: Mediators run their individual sub-auctions (called s-auctions) for the secondary slots provided
by them. For an advertiser there is another type of valuations and bids, the ones associated with s-auctions.
For the ith agent, let vsi,j and bsi,j denote her true valuation and the bid for the s-auction of jth mediator re-
spectively. In general, the two types of valuations or bids corresponding to p-auction and the s-auctions might
differ a lot. We also assume that vsi,j = 0 and bsi,j = 0 whenever i is a mediator. Further, for the advertisers
who do not participate in one auction (p-auction or s-auction), the corresponding true valuation and the bid are
assumed to be zero. Also, for notational convenience let us denote vsi,jesi,j by ssi,j where esi,j is the relevance
score of ith agent for the s-auction of jth mediator.
• Payment models for s-auctions: Mediators could sell their secondary slots by impression (PPM), by pay-
per-click (PPC) or pay-per-conversion(PPA). In the following analysis, we consider PPC.
– Freedom of participation: Advertisers are free to bid for primary as well as secondary slots.
– True valuations of the mediators: The true valuation of the mediators are derived from the expected revenue
(total payments from advertisers) they obtain from the corresponding s-auctions1 ex ante.
3 Bid Profiles at SNE
For simplicity, let us assume participation of a single mediator and the analysis involving several mediators can be
done in a similar fashion. For notational convenience let
f = f1, the fitness of the mediator
l = l1, the position of the primary slot assigned to the mediator
L = L1, the number of secondary slots provided by the mediator in her s-auction
M = M1, the index of the mediator i.e. M th agent is the mediator
γ˜j = γ˜1,j, is the effective position based CTR of the jth secondary slot provided by the mediator
vsi,1 = v
s
i , is the true valuation of the agent i for the s-auction
bsi,1 = b
s
i , is the bid of the agent i for the s-auction, and
ssi,1 = s
s
i = v
s
i e
s
i , where esi = esi,1 is the relevance score of ith agent for the s-auction.
The p-auction as well as the s-auction is done via RBR with GSP, i.e. the mechanism currently being used by
Google and Yahoo!, and the solution concept we use is Symmetric Nash Equilibria(SNE)[2,7]. Suppose the allocations
for the p-auction and s-auction are σ : {1, 2, . . . , N} −→ {1, 2, . . . , N} and τ : {1, 2, . . . , N} −→ {1, 2, . . . , N}
respectively. Then the payoff of the ith agent from the combined auction (p-auction and s-auction together) is
ui = γσ−1(i)
(
s
p
i − r
p
σ−1(i)+1
)
+ γ˜τ−1(i)
(
ssi − r
s
τ−1(i)+1
)
where
r
p
j = b
p
σ(j)e
p
σ(j),
rsj = b
s
τ(j)e
s
τ(j).
From the mathematical structure of payoffs and strategies available to the bidders wherein two different uncorrelated
values can be reported as bids in the two types of auctions independently of each other2, it is clear that the equilibrium
of the combined auction game is the one obtained from the equilibria of the p-auction game and the s-auction game
each played in isolation. In particular at SNE[2, 7],
γir
p
i+1 =
K∑
j=i
(γj − γj+1)s
p
σ(j+1) for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,K
and
γ˜ir
s
i+1 =
L∑
j=i
(γ˜j − γ˜j+1)s
s
τ(j+1) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , L
which implies that (see Eq. (1))
γir
s
i+1 =
L−1∑
j=i
(γj − γj+1)s
s
τ(j+1) + γLs
s
τ(L+1) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , L
1 This way of deriving the true valuation for the mediator is reasonable for the mediator can participate in the p-auction several
times and run her corresponding s-auction and can estimate the revenue she is deriving from the s-auction.
2 This assumption was motivated by some empirical examples from Google Adword3.
where
s
p
σ(l) = s
p
M = f
L∑
j=1
γjr
s
j+1 = f

L−1∑
j=1
(γj − γj+1)js
s
τ(j+1) + γLLs
s
τ(L+1)


is the true valuation of the mediator multiplied by her relevance score as per our definition1, which is the expected
revenue she derives from her s-auction ex ante given a slot in the p-auction and therefore the mediator’s payoff at SNE
is
uM = γlf

L−1∑
j=1
(γj − γj+1)js
s
τ(j+1) + γLLs
s
τ(L+1)

−
K∑
j=l
(γj − γj+1)s
p
σ(j+1).
4 Revenue of the Auctioneer
In this section, we discuss the change in the revenue of the auctioneer due to the involvement of the mediator. The
revenue of the auctioneer with the participation of the mediator is
R =
K∑
j=1
γjr
p
j+1 =
K∑
j=1
(γj − γj+1)js
p
σ(j+1)
and similarly, the revenue of the auctioneer without the participation of the mediator is
R0 =
∑K
j=1(γj − γj+1)js
p
σ˜(j+1) where σ˜(j) = σ(j) for j < l and σ˜(j) = σ(j + 1) for j ≥ l
=
∑l−2
j=1(γj − γj+1)js
p
σ(j+1) +
∑K
j=l−1(γj − γj+1)js
p
σ(j+2).
Therefore,
R −R0 =
K∑
j=max{1,l−1}
(γj − γj+1)j(s
p
σ(j+1) − s
p
σ(j+2))
≥ 0 as sp
σ(i) ≥ s
p
σ(i+1)∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,K + 1 at SNE.
Thus revenue of the auctioneer always increases by the involvement of the mediator. As we can note from the
above expression, smaller the l better the improvement in the revenue of the auctioneer. To ensure a smaller value of l,
the mediator’s valuation which is the expected payments that she obtains from the s-auction should be better, therefore
fitness factor f should be very good. There is another way to improve her true valuation. The mediator could actually
run many subauctions related to the specific keyword in question. This can be done as follows: besides providing the
additional slots on the landing page, the information section of the page could contain links to other pages wherein
further additional slots associated with a related keyword could be provided3. With this variation of the model, a better
value of l could possibly be ensured leading to a win-win situation for everyone.
Theorem 1 Increasing the capacity via mediator improves the revenue of auctioneer.
5 Efficiency
Now let us turn our attention to the change in the efficiency and as we will prove below, the efficiency always improves
by the participation of the mediator.
3 For example, the keyword “personal loans” or “easy loans” and the mediator “personalloans.com”.
E0 =
K∑
j=1
γjs
p
σ˜(j) =
l−1∑
j=1
γjs
p
σ(j) +
K∑
j=l
γjs
p
σ(j+1) and
E =
l−1∑
j=1
γjs
p
σ(j) +
K∑
j=l+1
γjs
p
σ(j) + γlf
L∑
j=1
γjs
s
τ(j)
∴ E − E0 = γlf
L∑
j=1
γjs
s
τ(j) −
K∑
l
(γj − γj+1)s
p
σ(j+1)
= γlf
L∑
j=1
γjs
s
τ(j) − γlr
p
l+1
≥ 0
as γlf
L∑
j=1
γjs
s
τ(j) ≥ γlf
L∑
j=1
γjr
s
j+1 = γls
p
σ(l) ≥ γlr
p
l+1 at SNE .
Theorem 2 Increasing the capacity via mediator improves the efficiency.
6 Advertisers’ Payoffs
Clearly, for the newly accommodated advertisers, that is the ones who lost in the p-auction but win a slot in s-auction,
the payoffs increase from zero to a postitive number. Now let us see where do these improvements in the revenue of
the auctioneer, in payoffs of newly accommodated advertisers, and in the efficiency come from? Only thing left to look
at is the change in the payoffs for the advertisers who originally won in the p-auction, that is the winners when there
was no mediator. The new payoff for jth ranked advertiser in p-auction is
uσ(j) = γjs
p
σ(j) −
K∑
i=j
(γi − γi+1)s
p
σ(i+1) + u
s
σ(j)
where
usσ(j) = γlfγτ−1(σ(j))
(
ssσ(j) − r
s
τ−1(σ(j))+1
)
is her payoff from the s-auction. Also, for j ≤ l− 1, her payoff when there was no mediator is
u0
σ(j) = γjs
p
σ(j) −
∑K
i=j(γi − γi+1)s
p
σ˜(i+1)
= γjs
p
σ(j) −
∑l−2
i=j(γi − γi+1)s
p
σ(i+1) −
∑K
i=l−1(γi − γi+1)s
p
σ(i+2).
∴ uσ(j) − u
0
σ(j) = u
s
σ(j) −
∑K
i=l−1(γi − γi+1)(s
p
σ(i+1) − s
p
σ(i+2))
Similarly, for j ≥ l + 1, her payoff when there was no mediator is
u0
σ(j) = γj−1s
p
σ(j) −
∑K
i=j−1(γi − γi+1)s
p
σ(i+2)
∴ uσ(j) − u
0
σ(j) = u
s
σ(j) −
∑K
i=j−1(γi − γi+1)(s
p
σ(i+1) − s
p
σ(i+2))
Therefore, in general we have,
uσ(j) − u
0
σ(j) = u
s
σ(j) −
K∑
i=max{l−1,j−1}
(γi − γi+1)(s
p
σ(i+1) − s
p
σ(i+2)).
Thus, for the jth ranked winning advertiser from the auction without mediation, the revenue from the p-auction
decreases by
∑K
i=max{l−1,j−1}(γi − γi+1)(s
p
σ(i+1) − s
p
σ(i+2)) and she faces a loss unless compensated for by her
payoffs in s-auction. Further, this payoff loss will be visible only to the advertisers who joined the auction game
before the mediator and they are likely to participate in the s-auction so as to make up for this loss. Thus, via the
mediator, a part of the payoffs of the originally winning advertisers essentially gets distributed among the newly
accommodated advertisers. However, when the mediator’s fitness factor f is very good, it might be a win-win situation
for everyone. Depending on how good the fitness factor f is, sometimes the payoff from the s-auction might be enough
to compensate for any loss by accommodating new advertisers. Let us consider an extreme situation when L = K and
τ = σ˜. The gain in payoff for the advertiser σ(j) is
γlf
K∑
i=j
(γi − γi+1)(s
s
σ(j) − s
s
σ(i+1))−
K∑
i=max{l−1,j−1}
(γi − γi+1)(s
p
σ(i+1) − s
p
σ(i+2))
Therefore as long as
f ≥
∑K
i=max{l−1,j−1}(γi − γi+1)(s
p
σ(i+1) − s
p
σ(i+2))
γl
∑K
i=j(γi − γi+1)(s
s
σ(j) − s
s
σ(i+1))
the advertiser σ(j) faces no net loss in payoff and might actually gain.
7 Concluding Remarks
In the present work, we have studied the emergence of diversification in the adword market triggered by the inherent
capacity constraint. We proposed and analyzed a model where additional capacity is created by a for-profit agent who
compete for a slot in the original auction, draws traffic and runs its own sub-auction. Our study potentially indicate a
3-fold diversification in the adword market in terms of (i) the emergence of new market mechanisms, (ii) emergence
of new for-profit agents, and (iii) involvement of a wider pool of advertisers. Therefore, we should expect the internet
economy to continue to develop richer structure, with room for different types of agents and mechanisms to coexist.
In particular, capacity constraints motivates the study of yet another model where the additional capacity is created by
the search engine itself, essentially acting as a mediator itself and running a single combined auction. This study will
be presented in an extended version of the present work.
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